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Hostile Witnesses, Judicial Interactions  
and Out-of-Court Narratives 
in a North Indian District Court 
 
Daniela Berti 
__________________________________________________ 
 
 
This article aims to contrast a common opinion that people in India have a strong orientation 
to court compared to other forms of negotiation or advising (Galanter 1969, Foster  2007). In 
spite of the centrality of the court system to Indian public life, the flow of cases arriving at 
court may simply corresponds to a choice which the parties make in the first place, and which 
will eventually be abandoned in favour of private forms of compromise. By relying on the 
ethnography of a court case followed in a District court of Himachal Pradesh this 
contribution will show how even in serious criminal cases where no private compromise is 
allowed, it often happens that all the prosecutor witnesses deny before the judge what they are 
supposed to have previously stated to the police. The analyses of court's interactions and out 
of court narratives will show how non official forms of conciliation may internally unsettles 
the rules of evidence followed in criminal proceedings. 
I 
 
In a short article on the Indian legal system published by Foster (2007), an American 
Attorney at Law, he notes  that with a million lawyers and 70,000 new lawyers each year, 
India boasts the world's second largest number of legal professionals after the United States. 
Further, in India, contrary to the United States, relatively few cases are settled outside the 
courtroom (Ibid.: 26) Forty years previously, in the introduction to a special issue of Law & 
Society dedicated mostly to South Asia, Marc Galanter had observed that a specificity of 
Indian lawyers, in contrast to their American counterparts, was their strong orientation 
towards courts (compared to other legal settings) and their orientation towards litigation rather 
than advising, negotiating or planning. This orientation towards courts, Galanter wrote, ‘is 
vividly displayed in spatial terms – lawyers are to be found literally at the court’ (Galanter 
1969: 27).  Indeed, ‘Judicial Court Complexes’ in India are often the most animated parts of 
the towns where they are located, with an incessant coming and going of people, from other 
towns or distant villages.  
However, in spite of the centrality of the court system–inherited from British common 
law– to Indian public life, the flow of cases arriving at court sometimes simply corresponds to 
a choice which the parties make in the first place, and which will eventually be abandoned in 
favour of other non official forms of compromise or adjustment. Even in serious criminal 
cases where the state acts as plaintiff and where no private compromise is allowed, it often 
happens that all the witnesses that the prosecutor calls to the court to prove his or her case 
deny or strongly tone down their previous statements once questioned by the judge. 
The problem of what in common law terminology is called ‘hostile witnesses’ is a 
recurring one, and has provoked many reactions and discussions from judges, politicians, and 
press editorials, in an attempt to find the best measures to redress the problem.  While high-
profile and publicized trials where a witness has been suspected of being politically 
pressurized or bribed get much attention, in fact, this is a situation that judges or prosecutors 
of any small district town are very familiar with. In many such cases, the fact that prosecution 
witnesses turn hostile is not necessarily due to political pressure or to corruption but to 
various village or familial dynamics which influence the trial. In fact, even in criminal cases 
which are defined in the Indian Penal Code as non-compoundable so that no private 
compromise is allowed (cf. Baxi in this issue) the plaintiff as well as the witnesses who have 
initially testified against the accused, may decide to testify now in his or her favour.  
While these forms of conciliation or compromise have frequently been documented by 
anthropologists working at a village level (Cohn 2001, Hayden 1999, Moore 1993), they have 
not yet been studied in the form they take at the very moment of the trial, in the courtroom. 
Even though the parties cannot disclose the compromise they have reached privately at a 
village or family level, at the trial this private compromise is used to deliver a public judicial 
acquittal. Even as it keeps intact the appearance of a legal trial, the private compromise 
internally unsettles the  rules of evidence followed in criminal proceedings.  
This article analyses this move from private compromise to public trial, and its impact on 
the judicial arena. I  show how the witnesses' denial of their previous statement takes form 
inside the court, the  verbal exchanges this corresponds to, and the kind of discourse it is 
associated with. This will lead me to spell out the roles that each participant –the judge, the 
prosecutor, the lawyers and witnesses- plays during the trial, to follow their verbal exchanges, 
and to see how these exchanges are transformed when they are recorded in written form, into 
what will become the official version of the trial. I will also compare the way in which the 
case is tried inside the court with the way it is understood or presented by the protagonists 
outside the courtroom (for a discussion of the ‘ethnography of discourse’ and speech acts in 
court rooms, see Conley and O'Barr (1990) 
From a methodological point of view, choosing the court as the starting place for fieldwork 
has the disadvantage of familiarising the observer with a case only many months, and even 
years, after the events took place – in other words, the time it takes the case to reach the court. 
Consequently, all the negotiations or compromises that have occurred at family or village 
level are no longer accessible to the observer – except in the form of a narration given by the 
protagonists to the conflict.. Thus, my focus here is not so much to understand what really 
happened within the village or family prior to the court hearing, but to analyse how village or 
family dynamics are played out inside the courtroom and how they actually influence the trial 
proceedings. This is an important point to be underlined. Indeed, what has so far been 
overlooked is that the court itself is a site where a dispute may be resolved informally, but 
with the trappings of formal procedure.  
 
 
 II 
The Trial  
 
Facts into sections 
 
The case was opened by the State of Himachal Pradesh represented by the Public 
Prosecutor, against Gudu,1
The FIR was registered under two sections of the Indian Criminal Code: section 498A 
‘punishment for subjecting a married woman to cruelty’ which is punishable by ’three years' 
imprisonment and a fine’ and under section 306, ’abetting the commission of suicide’ whose 
punishment is ’10 years' imprisonment and a fine’. These two sections are part of the 
measures taken in India to prevent so-called ‘dowry deaths’, i.e. deaths of married women 
who have been harassed by their husbands or in-laws by incessant demands for dowry.   In 
order to prevent such abuse and under pressure from a large number of legislators and 
women's associations, dowry was (officially) forbidden according to the Dowry Prohibition 
Act of 1961. Following on from this Act (which did little  to alter former usages), a series of 
amendments have been enacted, 
 a forty-year-old man from a village in Mandi district. After the 
death of his first wife, Gudu had married a twenty year old girl, Kaushlya,  with whom he had 
two sons. In December 2004, Kaushlya was found hanging from a tree in the forest 
surrounding her village. The police was called in and an FIR (First Information Report) was 
recorded against Gudu, on the request of the girl's mother, Saro Devi and the girl’s paternal 
uncle, Buddhu Ram, a retired policeman. Buddhu Ram’s daughter was married to the brother 
of the accused, making the relationship between the two families especially strong.  
2 such as Section 113 A of the Indian Evidence Act, where 
‘the Court may presume, having regard to all the other circumstances of the case, that such 
suicide had been abetted by her husband or by such relative of her husband’  (on the dowry 
provisions, see Menski 1998 and Palkar 2003). As a consequence of these measures, 
whenever a young married woman commits suicide, her husband and in-laws are immediately 
suspected and, upon the slightest accusation, arrested.3
When Kaushlya died in September 2004, Gudu, who was accused by the girl's mother of 
being responsible for what had happened, was immediately arrested by the police. After a 
period of three weeks imprisonment he was bailed out until the beginning of the trial, which 
started in October 2006 in a Session Court in Mandi district, in Himachal Pradesh  and ended 
in June 2007 with an acquittal. The case was tried in the court of Judge A.D., who gave me 
permission to sit right next to the witness bar and the stenographer. I will start by  analysing  
some passages of the trial interactions before considering the way in which the case was 
presented by the protagonists outside the courtroom.  
  
                                                 
1 The names of the participants in the trial have been modified to protect their anonymity.   
2 The amendments include section 498-A, which has been added to the Criminal Law (Second Amendment) Act, 
1983; section 198-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, and section 113-A of the Indian Evidence Act.  
3 This threat of arrest has led to a number of newspaper articles which denounce what  is called the misuse of the 
dowry provisions. See for example, Indian Dowry Law (209a): Myth Vs. Reality. An Investigative Report 
http://www.498a.org/contents/Publicity/498aBooklet.pdf 
. 
In order to be able to follow the interactions that took place at the trial it is important to 
start with the allegation made by the girl’s mother, Saro Devi, against her son-in-law Gudu on 
the day of the girl’s death. The allegation, dated 10-12-2004, was written in Hindi by the 
police on Saro Devi’s behalf, and signed by her at the police station. Here is one passage from 
the document:  
 
I [Saro Devi] married my daughter Kaushlya Devi with Gudu on 9-10-2000 according to the 
Hindu ritual. We gave the dowry to our daughter according to our position. My daughter had a 
daughter and a son. My son-in–law Gudu used to beat her when he drank wine and his brothers also 
beat her. I met my daughter yesterday and she was alright and today, 10-12-04, at almost 1 o’clock 
Darshan Ram told me that my daughter Kaushlya Devi committed suicide by putting a rope around 
her neck and hanging herself from a tree. I have doubts about my son-in-law, Gudu, concerning the 
death of my daughter Kaushlya Devi. She got tired of his beatings and put the rope around her neck 
and finished her life. (my translation) 
 
We will see how this allegation will be denied during the trial not only by the girl’s mother 
but by all the other prosecution witnesses who had given a similar version to the police, at the 
time of the events.  
In the following pages my aim is not to address the subject of dowry deaths, or to discuss 
the pertinence of the measures taken by the law to prevent and punish this kind of crime (on 
this, see Menski 1998). We will see that, given the direction the trial took, the hypothesis of a 
dowry death was immediately abandoned, the question being rather whether the girl was 
maltreated by her husband. I will move now to analyse the interactions between the 
protagonists during the trial.  
 
 
Testing witnesses 
 
In consonance with Indian proceedings, the State (in this case the regional state of Himachal 
Pradesh) was the plaintiff party, while eleven other people were prosecution witnesses. The 
defence chose to present no one.     
On the first day of the trial, with the file lying before him, the Judge waited for the 
witnesses to appear before the bar. They had to notify their presence, then go out again and 
wait their turn outside. The first witness on the list was Saro Devi, the mother of the girl who 
committed suicide. However, before ushering her in, the judge called the pradhan (the 
president of the village council in the accused, Gudu’s, village) to the bar for some 
preliminary questions. The pradhan, a woman in her forties, was also scheduled as 
prosecution witness on the same day. This interaction was considered to be ‘confidential’ and 
was not therefore recorded by the transcriber.    
During this informal interaction, the judge reminded the pradhan of her statement at the 
time of the investigation that the reason for Kaushlya’s suicide was that her husband had been 
harassing her for a long time. This preliminary questioning shows the judge's intention ‘to 
test’ the witness's attitude in order to understand whether such an important witness from the 
prosecutor's side maintained her accusation regarding the accused, and thus to what extent the 
 prosecutor would be able to prove the accusations. In fact, as the judge explained to me in 
other occasions, given the pradhan's role of mediator in the village, the attitude he adopts 
before the court might enable the judge to evaluate what other villagers would do. Here are 
some passages from these interactions, translated from Hindi by me. In some cases, when the 
judge or the prosecutor used the English (thus without being understood by the pradhan) I will 
indicate it in the text. 
   
Judge to the pradhan: It is written here [in the police report] that she [Kaushlya, the girl 
who committed suicide] was extremely troubled.  
Prosecutor, cutting in and quite harshly to the pradhan: Speak now!  
Judge, more kindly: Speak clearly, ok?     
 
Pradhan, in a firm tone of voice: Nobody troubled her. 
Judge, ironically, and without looking at the woman: Ha! There you go… 
 
The judge's comment on the witness's reply caused the lawyers, who had moved nearer to 
the bench to follow the interactions more closely, to laugh out loud. The judge (as well as the 
lawyers) had indeed already grasped the situation: the village president had become ‘hostile’, 
which would question the possibility of the other witnesses maintaining their accusation. This 
was then explicitly stated by the prosecutor who commented: ‘If the village president does 
that (tells a lie), the others will do the same!’4
 
  
Pradhan: I am telling the truth. 
Prosecutor: Then tell us, why you didn't say [as you said in your statement] that he [the 
accused] was doing something wrong? 
Judge, cutting in and addressing the prosecutor: Why has the case been made then? 
(Then addressing the pradhan): Prior to this, did anyone also [in the village] hang 
themselves?  
Pradhan, calmly: She did not hang herself. 
Judge: What? How did she die then?  
Pradhan: When we arrived there [at the place where the dead body was found] she had 
fallen down and her shawl and sickle were on the ground.  
Prosecutor, cutting in and ironically: Of course, the forest is always a very dangerous 
place! (Lawyers laugh)  
 
Though the judge had so far thought that the woman's suicide would not be questioned, he 
soon realized that this was in fact not the case: the village president not only denied what she 
had previously declared (about the woman being harassed) but she also firmly denied that the 
                                                 
4 The fact that the village president's attitude may be indicative of what the other witnesses will say at the trial is 
frequently noted by authors writing about the relationship between the panchayat and the court (see for example 
Moore 1993: 85). This shows how, though the pradhan is now deprived of a judicial role, he/she is a crucial 
protagonist as regards the relations villagers have with the court and he/she is a regular witness in the court. 
His/her attitude plays a crucial role in the version that the other witnesses will adopt before the court. 
case had anything to do with a suicide. Another version of the events then emerged, that of an 
accident.  
 
Prosecutor, rudely in English to the judge: She is not telling the truth! 
Pradhan: Nobody there [at the place where the dead body was found] said that she had 
hanged herself. 
Judge, quietly: We are not talking about phansi (hanging), we are just asking how she 
died? 
 
While the prosecutor assumed an aggressive and sarcastic tone vis-à-vis the witness, the 
judge preferred to allow the woman the chance to present her own version of the facts. This 
happened quite frequently in Judge A.D.’s court and may be explained, at least partly, by the 
different roles the prosecutor and judge play during the trial. The prosecutor, who is directly 
responsible for proving the case, appears to be particularly concerned with a ‘search for 
proof/evidence’, whereas the judge appears more concerned with a ‘truth’ (Gibbons et 
al.,2004.: 46). Yet the different attitudes the judge and the prosecutor adopted towards the 
witness may also be partly explained by their different personalities. A.D., scrupulous, 
attentive, extremely self-confident and always keen to be entertained in legal discussions, 
contrasted with the personality of the prosecutor, a simpler man rather brusque with 
witnesses, especially those not responding as he would have liked.  
The judge pursued the interaction by asking the woman to tell him about the place where 
Kaushlya’s dead body had been found. He wanted to know whether the forest where the 
woman had been found came within the area of her panchayat.  
 
Judge: Is the place (where Kaushilya went) close to your place? 
Pradhan: It is very far from our house. 
Prosecutor, very harshly: No, their house (of Kaushlya) is in her panchayat and 
panchayat people know this. 
Pradhan, insisting and cutting in: Panchayat people do not go to other houses… 
Prosecutor, cutting in: As a panchayat president it is your duty to know what happens in 
other houses. 
Pradhan: Panchayat people do not know what anyone is doing at home. 
Prosecutor: You had to gather information about this.  
 
The Prosecutor was trying to make the pradhan feeling responsible for what had happened 
by implying that since the pradhan’s house was very close to the place where the girl lived she 
should have known whether she was maltreated by her husband. But the pradhan, who 
showed great self-control, readily defended herself and denied what the Prosecutor was 
defining as a ‘panchayat duty’. The judge then cut in by asking a question which implicitly 
accused the woman of lying. 
 
Judge: Perhaps they [Gudu and his family] backed you in the elections? 
Pradhan: What, sir?  
Judge: Perhaps they backed you in the elections? 
 Pradhan: We did not pay any attention to this. We do not know of this, and who will say 
‘I supported you in the election’? 
Judge: Today everyone says that they supported [the pradhan, in order to obtain 
something from her/him]. Today they are very clever. 
Pradhan: They didn't do that. 
 
By evoking in court what the reason might be for a pradhan to testify in favour of one 
villager, the judge was trying to give a political explanation to a criminal case which had, in 
principle, nothing to do with politics. However, reference to political interest, is 
systematically made in case of a pradhan turning hostile. Besides, the reason why the pradhan 
had been called to testify in the court was not because she was an eyewitness (in fact she 
reached the victim much later than other villagers) but because she was the pradhan of the 
place.  
 
Judge: I know you didn’t see anything. You went there [to the place where the events 
took place] very late. What was the situation there? Whose fault was it? Those nearby 
said something and their family members also said something.5
Pradhan: Her family members are very simple. They do not know anything. 
  
Prosecutor, ironically: Well, did she die or not? (Other lawyers laugh) 
Pradhan: Yes, she died. 
Prosecutor: Then how did she die? 
 
The pradhan began to describe what people said after the body had been found. She said 
she had heard that the girl had gone to a marriage the day before and on the day of her death, 
went to collect grass in the forest and while cutting grass on a tree, she fell down and died.  
 
Prosecutor, addressing the judge: No, no sir, it's a case of hanging! By falling from the 
tree she cannot end up hanging there. 
Judge, referring to me: You see this foreigner there. She's going to see how much Indian 
women lie.   
 
This was his implicit way of accusing her of telling a lie but the lady remained 
unperturbed. The defence lawyer, who had followed the interactions without saying a word, 
intervened here for the first time to support the woman's version: ‘She fell from the tree. She'd 
hanged that bag for grass in the tree and it got stuck in the branches. The rope of the bag came 
up round her neck and suffocated her’.   
The judge, without seeming to react to the lawyer’s intervention, added a comment 
addressed to the pradhan: ‘In this kind of case they [villagers] should ostracise [the accused]’, 
inferring that the pradhan was expressing, for one reason or another, her support for the 
accused. Prosecutor, cutting in: If somebody does something wrong in a village, it is up to the 
panchayat to know who did the wrong. 
                                                 
5 The judge himself was asking the witness to report ‘hearsay’, which is rejected in a courtroom (see also Conley 
and O'Barr, 1990:15).    
Then all speaking at the same time:  
 
Pradhan: But we don’t know. 
Judge: Yes, but try to find out. As for the rest, living and dying, it is in the hands of god.  
Defence lawyer: But now she is no longer the village president. 
Prosecutor: Yes, now there is another lady president. 
Judge to the pradhan: Really? Then I would like to see that lady [the new pradhan] and I 
want to tell her that this should never happen again [case of hanging]. Ladies can't do 
this. They have no right to do this. 
Here the judge, by referring to the frequency of women’s suicides, expresses his feeling 
that the problem could not be solved simply through the law, but by solving the case at the 
local level. This interaction also shows the kind of ‘turn-taking’ (Drew and Atkinson 1979) 
that operates in the courtroom whereby, especially when the witness starts to turn hostile, the 
prosecutor, the judge, and the lawyer may all ask questions at the same time - what is the sign 
of a certain confusion.  
After this informal and preliminary interview the judge asked the pradhan to wait outside 
the courtroom for the official hearing. Then, he proceeded to collect the evidence of Saro 
Devi, Kaushlya Devi’s mother.  
 
 
Oral versus written 
 
We have seen how the judge, before officially starting to collect the evidence, questioned the 
village pradhan as a sort of barometer indicating the direction the trial was to take. This 
questioning, though held in public, was not recorded in writing. Furthermore, it was not heard 
by the other witnesses, who were sitting outside the courtroom, waiting to be called. By 
contrast, with the arrival at the bar of the girl’s mother, Saro Devi (who the record gave as the 
first Prosecutor Witness, PW 1) the interactions began to be recorded. Some passages of Saro 
Devi's evidence will be used here to show how the witnesses’ oral statements during the 
spoken evidence are reformulated to be recorded in a written report.6
Saro Devi was a village woman in her forties. Her husband was not at the court since he 
was mentally retarded as a consequence of a disease he had some years before.  The judge 
started to ask her some preliminary questions: 
 
 
Judge, in Hindi: After marriage, where did your daughter live? Does she have 
children?  
Saro Devi: Yes, there are children.  
                                                 
6 While most of the witnesses speak Hindi or Pahari (the local language), their statements are immediately 
translated into English and reworded in a judicial language. Most of the time it is the judge who translates the 
witness's words, yet the prosecutor and the defence can also do this. During the cross-examination there may 
even be some tension as to who should first dictate the translation to the transcriber, so that it is worded in the 
most appropriate manner. Secondly, the reason why the witness’s oral reply is transformed when drafted in its 
written version is that what is orally a reply to a question is dictated by the judge to the transcriber in the form of 
a statement made by the witness in the first person –as a sort of personal narration. 
 Prosecutor: One daughter and one son. 
Judge, dictating in English: After marriage my daughter gave birth to a son and 
daughter.  
Judge, in Hindi: Where are they now? 
Saro Devi: At home. 
Judge: At your house or his [father’s] house?   
Saro Devi: They are at their [father’s] house 
Judge, dictating in English: …who are in custody of the accused. 
 
 
This is an important point in favour of the accused. Indeed, if there were no sons, there 
could have been more reason for harassment. The Prosecutor then intervened by asking, ‘after 
marriage did she use to come to your house?’. ‘Yes sir.’ the lady replied. This is also one of 
the first questions asked in this kind of case. In fact, if a married woman does not visit the 
natal home, always in a village other than her husband's, it is a sign that her in-laws and her 
husband blackmail her for dowry.   
After some more questioning, where the woman did not reveal any problems her daughter 
was having with Gudu and his family, she eventually said in vague terms that, yes, a year ago 
her daughter had started complaining that her husband was beating her.  
  
Judge: She did not say why he (Gudu) beat her?  
Saro Devi: No. 
 
The judge insisted on getting the woman to repeat the accusation she had made when the 
case had been recorded by the police. However, two years had passed since her initial 
statement and the woman seemed now to hesitate in repeating her accusations.  
Another point on which the prosecutor insisted during questioning was to find out since 
when Kaushlya had started complaining of being maltreated.  The prosecutor's concern must 
be interpreted in relation to the section under which the case was tried.  Under Section 113A 
of the Evidence Act, if a woman commits suicide ‘within a period of seven years from the 
date of her marriage’ the court may presume that the suicide had been abetted by her husband. 
To demonstrate his case, the prosecutor needed the woman to go back much further in the 
past. This would have shown that any maltreatment of Kaushlya was not due to sporadic 
misunderstanding between husband and wife, but was the outcome of a long-term attitude on 
the part of the husband. This would have given more substance to the hypothesis of a dowry 
issue.  
However, every time the prosecutor asked Saro Devi to go back to the very beginning of her 
daughter's problem, the woman kept starting her narration from a very recent period – which 
she perceived, independent of any legal considerations, as the most relevant period if the 
cause of her daughter's death was to be understood. This shows how, as Conley and O'Barr 
note in reference to the Anglo-American system, ‘the law of evidence is in one sense 
epistemological: it imposes on witnesses' accounts the law's view on what constitutes a fact 
and what sources of information are reliable’ (Conley and O’Barr 1990:18).  
The prosecutor continued to question her and make her say something against the accused; 
that he maltreated his wife or harassed her often over the years. Eventually the judge 
interrupted him, saying in English, ‘There is nothing in particular! She said that she (her 
daughter) did not complain about anything!’. The woman then said that, when the body was 
found, someone from the village called her and told her that her daughter had fallen from a 
tree. When she got there, she saw her daughter on the ground, who did not have any signs of 
strangulation on her neck. The prosecutor, looking astonished, said, ‘But how did she die 
then?’ To which the mother replied, ‘Sometimes she was sick. I do not know….Only god 
knows!’ 
The judge would not dictate this reply. Instead he dictated to the typist in English (thus 
without being understood by the witness) a sentence referring to the version that the woman 
had given in the police report: ‘I have reasons to believe that my daughter was killed by the 
accused due to maltreatment. My statement Ext. PA was recorded by the police and bears my 
signature’. He then addressed the woman with an astonished smile, ‘Your statement was 
written down at the time! It is a strange case!’ The woman reacted by murmuring, ‘There are 
two children. The children are young. They have to be looked after’. Although this last 
comment might have helped to explain why the woman did not confirm her previous written 
statement, it was not dictated by the judge to the transcriber either.  
The judge also decided not to take into account what the woman had said just prior to this 
comment; that her daughter showed no sign of strangulation round her neck at the time of her 
death and that she could not give the exact reason for her death. These statements were very 
different from what she had said two years before, in her deposition. The contradiction 
between these two versions might have led the judge to declare the lady a ‘hostile’ witness. 
Instead, he decided to take into account the written report she had given the police two years 
before, rather than her current oral version. This decision shows a certain attenuation of the 
principle of orality followed in other adversarial systems where the judge, as well as the jury, 
"do not bear any procedural memory exceeding the trial hearing" (Scheffer 2007:14).1 By 
contrast, in Indian criminal trials, depositions previously signed by the witnesses in the 
presence of the police –though having no value as evidence as in other adversarial system– are 
frequently used during the trial by the judge himself, and sometimes shown to the witness at 
the moment of the trial. As will emerge from the rest of the hearings, this is not the usual 
procedure. We will see how, with other witnesses, priority will be given to their oral 
statements which will be recorded as evidence.  
Saro Devi was then cross-examined by the defence lawyer. The lawyer insisted on one 
point that was essential for him to build his defence: he wanted the lady to say that her 
daughter frequently used to climb trees to cut leaves and that she carried a basket around the 
neck and the breast. He insisted on this point for quite a long time: 
 
Defence lawyer: When you have to cut grass in narrow and sloping places, you have to 
carry grass bag here (around your neck and on the back). Don't you? 
Lady: I don’t know… 
 
The judge seemed puzzled and asked the lawyer: What is this? The lawyer insisted, certain 
of the customs in the region: ‘When we have to take cuttings from a tree, we take a basket and 
 we wind one part here [around the neck] and the other here [around the stomach]. Kaushlya’s 
feet slipped on the tree and she found herself hanging from the branch because of the grass 
basket. She suffocated and died. This is all because of the basket’.  
The judge tried to put an end to the discussion and dictated to the transcriber in English ‘It 
is correct that a basket is fixed around the neck and the waist to pick grass and to collect 
leaves from a tree. I cannot say whether my daughter had fixed this basket in such a way on 
that particular day." (Court record).  
Other points that the defense lawyer managed to get out of the witness were that she had 
registered the case against her son-in-law under pressure from Beli Ram, her husband’s 
brother. When informed of Kaushlya’s death, Beli Ram had immediately gone to the site 
where the body was found and, being a retired policeman himself, had given villagers 
instructions on the procedure to follow.  The judge then dictated: “Beli Ram is my brother-in-
law who has retired from the Police Department. It is correct that I lodged the report with the 
police on the said Beli Ram's insistence.’  
After reproaching the defence lawyer for his excessive and useless questions, the judge 
asked the woman to sign the written record of the evidence and told her to leave.  
 
Non binding statements 
 
The pradhan was again called to the bar, this time to officially record the evidence. Taking 
into account what had happened in the previous informal interaction, the judge went straight 
to the point:  
 
Judge: When you got there, what did you see near the dead body?  
Pradhan: Nothing! Only a shawl and a sickle (to cut the grass).  
Judge: And the rope?  
Pradhan: There was no rope there. 
 
The prosecutor then murmured some words and the judge dictated:  
 
Judge: At this stage learned PP states that the witness is partly suppressing the truth and 
that he should be allowed to cross-examine the witness. Request considered and 
allowed.  
 
Here the judge, by speaking on behalf of the prosecutor, was asking and granting in a 
routine formula permission to cross-examine a witness whom he considered to have turned 
‘hostile’.7
                                                 
7 Normally the prosecutor does not cross-examine his or her own witnesses but since here the witness was no 
longer supporting the prosecutor’s case, he could get the right to cross-examine by declaring her hostile. 
 In fact, by denying the existence of the rope near the dead body the pradhan was 
again denying what she was supposed to have stated to the police during investigation. After 
inquiring from the pradhan her level of study (a way of asking if she was literate), the judge 
showed her the deposition which she had signed: ‘Look here, and then read that over there, at 
the beginning of the paper. When you signed here, it was all already written there. It is written 
in Hindi. Read! You are able to read Hindi, aren't you?’   
But the pradhan replied calmly, ‘It was not written there when I signed’. With this reply 
she was accusing the police of having added information (the presence of the rope) which was 
not there in the original document. The judge dictated in English:  
 
I have not stated to the police that rope, shawl and sickle were sealed by the police in 
separate parcel in my presence (confronted with portion A to A of mark A where it is so 
recorded).  
 
The Judge, showing signs of impatience, continued his enquiry by reading the report that 
the lady was supposed to have signed:  
 
Judge, reading the file: She [Kaushilya Devi] had some marks here near her arms, and 
some signs of hanging.  
Pradhan: No, it was not like that.  
 
The judge, after dictating her reply addressed the lady: 
  
Judge: Look, Pradhan ji, they [Gudu and his family] voted for you [in the panchayat 
elections] and in order to save him [Gudu] you are telling a lie.  
Pradhan: No Sir, they did not back me and I am not telling a lie.  
 
The judge formulated this last reply as follows: ‘It is incorrect that I am suppressing the 
truth because the accused backed me at the election of pradhan’. Then he commented, ‘Time 
is flying and witnesses are wasting time’. The prosecutor too made some last comments 
addressed to the woman, ‘This is your panchayat and you are telling a lie and hiding things’.   
Compared with Saro Devi's interrogation, we may note how differently the judge reacted 
faced with the witness’s denial of her previous accusations. In this case the witness's oral 
statement was dictated by the judge to the transcriber, but a reference to the written report was 
also added (such as ‘confronted with portion A to A of mark A where it is so recorded’). This 
mention is a technique commonly followed during the evidence record in order to indicate a 
contradiction between what the witness says in the courtroom and what is reported in the 
police report. Moreover, the pradhan was even more explicitly presented as a ‘hostile 
witness’. This was done by the judge by using a specific cross-examination technique which 
consists of evoking a reason for the witness’s change of stand and by dictating, on the 
witness’s behalf, a standardized formula whose effect is to affirm the very contrary of what is 
being denied: ‘It is incorrect that I am suppressing the truth because the accused backed me in 
the elections of pradhan’. Of course, neither the judge nor the prosecutor possessed any 
evidence to lead them to think that the accused could have put pressure on the pradhan 
concerning this specific case. They merely evoked the most logical reason for a pradhan to 
obstruct the prosecutor during the case.  
 The pradhan's attitude before the judge made the defence lawyer's task of cross-examining 
her easy. What emerged in the cross-examination appeared to give even more basis to the 
defence effort to show that the police had fabricated the whole case against the accused. For 
example, the defence provided the pradhan with the possibility of pointing out that the sickle 
she saw near the body was not the same as the one in the police's possession which had been 
exhibited before the judge. He asked the lady to confirm that the sickle there in the courtroom 
was the kind for cutting grass, whereas the one actually found near Kaushlya Devi's body was 
the kind for cutting leaves from trees. The pradhan’s confirmation that it was the latter type 
was a step forward in supporting the version that the girl slipped from the tree while she was 
cutting leaves.  
 
Mild accusations 
 
The medical witness who carried out the autopsy of the girl’s body was then examined. She 
gave a lot of quite detailed description and confirmed orally what he had written in his post-
mortem report, that the cause of death was ‘spinal cord compression due to hanging’. 
The defence lawyer tried to find various ways of making the doctor admit the possibility 
that the marks found on the body could well be a consequence of the girl falling from the tree. 
Much discussion ensued about the size of the mark found around the neck – was it a large 
mark as in the case of a cloth, or was it small, as in the case of a rope? The defence lawyer 
insisted on defending the hypothesis of an accident and even tried to actually demonstrate it 
by winding a cloth around the doctor's neck to show how ‘mechanically’ one could be hanged 
by the kind of basket used for grass.  
The doctor did not appear to support the lawyer’s hypothesis, and the judge eventually 
insisted that the lawyer stop his cross-examination on this particular point: ‘there is no way [to 
show this] it doesn't work!’   
Other witnesses came to the bar. Although they were all called ‘Prosecution Witnesses’, 
none of them gave much support to the Prosecutor’s case. At one point during the recording 
of evidence, the judge even lost his patience and, faced with yet another witness contradicting 
his previous statement, manifested his disappointment in Hindi: ‘I don't want to write down 
his statement! It is the same [as previous witnesses]! 
The only witness who somehow confirmed the accusation was the girl’s uncle, Beli Ram, 
the retired policeman who had suggested that the girl’s mother lodge an FIR against her son-
in-law. Beli Ram told the judge that a year before Kaushlya's death, after she had once again 
complained of Gudu’s maltreatment and beatings, he advised her husband to mend his ways. 
The accused then, Beli Ram added, ‘apologised and assured that he would treat Kaushlya 
Devi properly’.    
Reference to this request for forgiveness was not mentioned in the statement Beli Ram had 
given to the police upon Kaushlya's death and gave the judge to understand that even this 
important witness had eventually ‘turned hostile’. Without even waiting for the prosecutor’s 
reaction, the judge dictated to the transcriber the standardised formula commonly used in such 
a case:  ‘At this statement Learned Public Prosecutor stated that the witness is trying to 
suppress the truth, as such permission be granted to cross examine the witness. Prayer 
considered and allowed’. The Judge then resumed his questioning of Beli Ram:   
 
Judge (looking straight into Beli Ram’s eyes): Are you telling the truth or are you lying?  
Beli Ram: I am telling the truth. 
Judge: How did you give him advice [to tone down his behaviour]?   
Beli Ram: I made suggestions to both of them [husband and wife]. Whenever they 
fought, I would go there and make suggestions. And then Gudu would ask for 
forgiveness. 
Judge: What apologies did he make?  
Beli Ram: He said “Please forgive me this time, I will not do it again”.   
 
The judge appeared disappointed but somehow also resigned. Meanwhile the prosecutor 
continued to formulate some questions but Beli Ram’s replies, although confirming some of 
his previous statements, were not convincing enough to support the accusations. What the 
judge later wrote in his report may clarify the point: 
 
‘This witness [Beli Ram] has also not given any date, month or year of beating or 
maltreatment and his statement qua maltreatment is vague and general in nature. In fact 
this witness was got declared hostile by the prosecution There is nothing in the 
statement of this witness as to when Kaushlya Devi met him lastly and told about her 
suffering to him. In such circumstance, much reliance cannot be placed on the testimony 
of this witness. (Judge’s Order, Court record)8
 
 
It was now the defence lawyer's turn to cross-examine the witness: 
 
Defence lawyer: It is like this - you persuaded Saro Devi [the girl's mother] to make a 
false case and to trap Gudu. 
Beli Ram: No, it is not like that. 
Defence lawyer: You said to the villagers present that, no one should move the body 
otherwise you will get them all arrested.  
Beli Ram: No, it is not true! 
 
 The following appeared in the court record: ‘It is incorrect that the accused has been 
framed in this case at my insistence. It is incorrect that I told the co-villagers of the accused 
not to touch the body of Kaushlya, otherwise they would be arrested.’ The lawyer also evoked 
the idea that Beli Ram would have used his authority as an ex-policeman to scare villagers to 
let the police record a case against Gudu. Although he knew that both these ideas had been 
refused by the witness he wanted them to be written, at least under the negative form ‘It is 
incorrect that…’, in the court record.  
  
                                                 
8 This is the original English as dictated by the judge to the transcriber.  
 III 
Arguments and Judgment 
 
The arguments were made some days after concluding the recording of evidence, in the 
presence of the accused, with no other villagers present. The prosecutor who had presented 
the case was on leave. Anyway it was quite certain now that it was impossible to prove his 
case, since the witnesses had turned hostile. His place was taken by a prosecutor from a 
nearby court. He did not show much conviction concerning the case, and started to expose his 
arguments to the judge calmly: 
  
Prosecutor, to the Judge: Sir, there are two pieces of evidence for Kaushlya’s case. Saro 
Devi and Beli Ram are clearly saying that Kaushlya was maltreated by her husband, 
Gudu. I have also the post-mortem report of the doctor, and he says clearly that the 
signs in the neck were of rope so she had died because of suicide.  
Judge, to the Prosecutor: But Saro Devi said (during the hearing) that her daughter was 
afraid of beating but she was not maltreated. (Then, looking at the evidence record): She 
said that he was supplying all necessary things to her.  
Defence lawyer, to the Judge: Sir, it is not a case of suicide; Saro Devi said here that 
when she visited her daughter's house everything was fine there and the accused was 
providing her with everything, it was fine there. …This sickle was not also the same, it 
contradicts [the previous statement]. The rope was not found there either while the 
prosecution said that a rope had been cut down.  
Judge: But the doctor said she couldn't slip the way you are saying.  
Defence lawyer: But she never complained about maltreatment. 
Judge: Yes, the complaint of the parents is important in this matter, all others are not 
important.  
 
During the arguments the judge showed quite a different attitude compared to the way he had 
behaved during the evidence, when he frequently accused witnesses of having told a lie. The 
general atmosphere of the court was also different during the arguments – compared to the 
passion and tension which appeared during the witnesses’ interrogation. Here the discussion 
appeared much more technical, with the judge’s role usually limited to that of a passive 
listener. As a matter of fact, due to the absence of a jury,9
The arguments were pursued, with the defence lawyer reading line after line of recorded 
evidence. The lawyer repeatedly argued that Kaushlya had not committed suicide. He 
contended that if there had been a fight with her husband the day prior to the events, her body 
would have some sign of this maltreatment, or her bindi (mark on forehead) and sindhoor 
(coloured hair powder in parting) would at least have been removed. And even if there had 
been no fight and she had wanted to commit suicide why –the lawyer argued– would she have 
 the arguments here, unlike in an 
Anglo-American trial, do not assume a theatrical character; they take place during a tête-à-tête 
with the judge.   
                                                 
9  The jury system has been abolished in trial courts since 1960. 
bothered adorning her body? He said, ‘she would have been angry, why would she have put 
sindhoor on her scalp?. She was happy and only God knows why she died’. 
 
Judge: If a woman is unhappy, it does not mean that she won't use bindi and sindoor 
and she will become a widow.  
Lawyer: But the abetment has not been proved, Sir.  
Judge: Now give the introduction of the canon (law) so that you can explain… 
 
The judge here asks the lawyer to show how he had built up his defence by relying on court 
precedents. The lawyer highlighted different decisions of the High Court to support his 
argument. One of those cited by the defence was state of H.P. Vrs Savinder Kumar HLJ/174, 
2004 for the legal definition of ‘cruelity’ – "that mere beating by the accused would not 
constitute offence"; or the explanation attached to section 498-A, where the conduct of the 
offender "should be of such nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide".  But in 
the absence of cruelty, the benefit of the doubt goes to the accused. The lawyer went on 
quoting previous judgements and at the end, the judge closed the arguments by concluding 
‘This is right’.  
In his order the judge came back to the problem of ‘death for dowry’ treated by the two 
sections concerned by the case. Here is a passage from the English original version: 
  
No doubt there is an alarming increase in such like cases which are frequently coming 
before the courts. Such crimes are generally committed in complete secrecy inside the 
house and it becomes very difficult for the prosecution to lead evidence. No member of 
the family, even if he is a witness of the crime, would come forward to depose against 
another family member. The neighbors, whose evidence may be of some assistance, are 
generally reluctant to depose in court. However, the prosecution is to prove such 
circumstances on the record which compelled the wife to commit suicide and such 
circumstances are missing in the case in hand. (Court Record)  
 
While the judge, as it would appear in the report, made reference to the reticence of the 
girl’s mother or of the other family members to testify against the accused, the defense 
lawyer's version was different. What the lawyer chose to show was that the story of the 
suicide had been entirely invented by the members of the family, under pressure from Beli 
Ram. The hypothesis that the lawyer had tried to demonstrate during the trial was that of an 
accident – an idea which had also been supported by some prosecution witnesses, who had 
denied having seen a rope near the body. However, we will see how this hypothesis was just 
the version that the lawyer had chosen to present for his defense. 
 
IV 
The non legal story of the death 
 
Speaking outside the court, the defense lawyer had no doubt that Kaushlya had committed 
suicide. However, the reason for the suicide had nothing to do with dowry problems. He 
reconstructed a scenario which he claimed had taken place the night before the girl's death 
 when she went to attend a marriage in another village. I will give some details of his version 
in order to show the kind of narrative such suicide cases correspond to outside the courtroom.  
 
I tried to find out what the truth is because, of course, this is a case of suicide - there is 
the photograph, the rope and it is a proved and admitted case. So, what inquiries did I 
make on my part? The truth is that the day before the suicide, Gudu wanted to go to a 
wedding which was celebrated near his village. He told his wife that she had to bring his 
clothes to the place where he was working and that he would go straight on from there. 
She was a stubborn and moody girl and she said, “You have to stay at home and look 
after the cattle and children. I will go on my own”. So what did she do? She did not 
listen to him, and went with other villagers to that wedding and came back late at night. 
On the way back she was accompanied by other villagers, including some haughty boys 
from the village who had drunk some local liquor.  
 
The lawyer continued with some personal comments, not only about what he thought to be the 
specific personality of the girl but also general considerations about women's condition in 
India:  
 
Kaushlya Devi was a rather childish and short-tempered woman who was perhaps also 
unhappy with her husband. She was very pretty, extroverted and much younger than her 
husband and she flirted with some of the village boys. Gudu knew of the gossip, which 
was the reason why he sometimes abused his wife and hit her. This (continued the 
lawyer) does not mean ‘cruelty’ in the sense mentioned by article 498a of the Criminal 
Code (i.e. ‘Punishment for subjecting a married woman to cruelty’). He was just hitting 
her a little bit. … That girl was very loose. You saw her photo in the file. …There were 
some young boys in the village who teased her. They sometime told him (Gudu), when 
having a drink together, that she was playing around with somebody else. At least some 
boy or other told him that. On that particular day, those boys were also with them (his 
wife and other people). Then he came back from work, tied up the cattle, looked after 
the children, cooked some food and after eating it went to sleep. She arrived home at  
night and as soon as she had entered his room, he became angry and slapped her 
...shouting out that she was like a prostitute. ‘You went with those bad boys. Get out of 
here!’. So at night time she stayed in the kitchen outside ….In the morning she took her 
sickle and, feeling perhaps a little guilty and desperate, she committed suicide. Village 
women can act this way because they are not educated and are mostly simple-minded. 
They are not very mature. Why? Because they got married at a very young age….. Most 
marriages are arranged and this unsettles a wife. Her consent is never required. As for 
their body language, the wife is sometimes beautiful and husband not. Due to this 
mismatch, there is no mutual affection.  
 
 This way of presenting the case is certainly a mixture of what the lawyer had been told by 
Gudu and his personal feelings on the subject. Part of the commentary, however, appears to be 
part of a standardized script-like version which is regularly used by lawyers in preparing their 
defense in such cases. For example the fact of describing a girl who commits suicide as 
‘short-tempered’ is regularly evoked by the lawyer in similar cases – as if this would be a 
sufficient reason for a woman to commit suicide. Similarly, the scenario in which the 
husband, while drinking with other villagers, finds out about his wife’s relationship with 
another man is also quite frequently evoked in village stories (see Berti 2001).  
  It is important to stress here that the lawyer’s interpretation of the case emphasizes the 
psychological and sentimental reasons which might have led the girl to commit suicide. 
Nevertheless, all the psychological or personal factors taken into consideration by the lawyer 
in his understanding of the case were not mentioned at all during the arguments where the 
lawyer repeatedly defended the idea that Kaushlya's death was accidental. According to him, 
the idea of the accident was more plausible and easier to prove before the judge than what he 
considered to be ‘the true history’ (related to the problem between wife and husband). He said 
he had voluntarily decided to give up the point of the lady’s eccentric character: ‘I thought 
why raise a doubt? Because suicide is a crime’ – he said.  
 
The accused, with whom I talked out of the court, confirmed to me the version of the 
suicide:    
 
"We had quarreled many times before, Once she also stabbed me [showing me the mark 
of a wound by a knife on his hand]. After quarreling she often used to go out for cutting 
grass but she always came back. When graha (planets) are not good then these things 
happen."  
 
He told me that Beli Ram asked the mother to register the case against him because his 
daughter was married to his younger brother and he was scared that she would also commit 
suicide. He also told me that at the time of the events, villagers were reluctant to call the 
police and were ready to carry the body to the crematory ground. They had said, “Now she is 
dead and if we call the police, her husband will go to jail and who will take care of her kids? 
But when the daughter’s uncle, Beli Ram, came to know what had happened he said: 
“Nobody touches the body or you will all go to prison”. Then Beli Ram called the police who, 
under his instructions and authority (he was an ex-policeman) made the case against him. 
Since then, however  things had changed. The likelihood that he would spend ten years in 
prison and that his children would be left to fend for themselves, had convinced everybody 
that he should not be condemned.  
 
"My uncle in law [Beli Ram] even said that you will get free and if you will get 
convicted I will be at fault [...] My mother-in-law also told me that she said before the 
court that you did not quarrel and you did not beat her and you gave everything to her. 
[...] My brother's wife also said once to her husband that sister-in-law [Kaushlya] is 
wrong and brother-in-law is a good man. Sister -in-law is very nice with me. She also 
uses to wash my children's clothes. 
 
Gudu was sure that all the family members as well as other villagers were now ready to 
help him and that the judgment was going to be in his favor. He was happy about the idea that 
 he was soon going to get a copy of the judgment which would allow him to finally get a 
permanent job (he was working on daily wages as a road construction laborer). He stressed 
the normality of his family relations with his mother-in-law whom he often visited with his 
children. "If I am sent to jail who will look after my children? - he repeated to me many times 
- My parents are old and poor. My father-in-law is mentally sick and my brother has already 
his own children".  
The lawyer too was sure of the fact that the Kaushilya's family members, including Beli 
Ram, were now in favor of the accused and also mentioned some meetings that had taken 
place among the family members. The latter were likely to support the version of the accident 
(as he himself had suggested) and to deny before the judge that a rope had been found by the 
police at the place of the suicide. This was also a further reason to deny Kaushlya’s suicide 
and try to defend the idea of an accident. 
 
 
V 
Conclusion 
 
 
At the end of the trial one thing was clear, as the judge himself told me, that some 
negotiations had taken place over the two years between registration and trial, at village and 
family level. As we have seen, the defense lawyer referred to discussions held among relatives 
and village elders, which led to the conclusion that for the children's sake, it would be better if 
Gudu was acquitted.  
The judge in his order did not refer to these family considerations, although he may have 
taken them into consideration in his final decision. However, in his 13 pages of judgement he 
radically attenuated the sometimes accusative tone with which he addressed the witnesses 
during the trial. He also made no reference to the fact that all along the trial he had kept 
denouncing the fact that the prosecution witnesses had turned hostile. After commenting on 
the seriousness of the so-called ‘dowry deaths’ he insisted on the necessity for such cases to 
be clearly proved by the prosecutor, which he recorded, had not been the case here. He finally 
justified his decision to acquit the accused based on the total lack of evidence on the part of 
the prosecution.  
It should be noted that in the judge's report, court interactions and the arguments there is no 
attempt to understand why Kaushlya had decided to end her life. The only issue was whether 
the reason why she died was due to her husband's ‘cruelty’ and if the legal definition of 
‘cruelty’ corresponded to the situation at hand. Similarly, all the psychological, sociological 
and personality-based  explanations regarding the case that the defence lawyer had given me 
outside the courtroom were not evoked at all during the trial, with most witnesses now 
supporting the idea that Kaushlya's death was accidental following a fall from the tree.  
Indeed, the case shows how the written version of the interactions and the text of the 
judgment, do not reveal the true dynamics of the case, the attitudes, the roles (prescribed or 
played) of the various participants. The details of a large number of important interactions 
which may have helped understand the case were not transcribed in the court documents or in 
the judge’s order. The moment the judge started to translate the witness's sentence and to 
dictate it to the transcriber, he had already discerned the facts of the case (Rosen 1989). We 
have seen, for example, how the words of the girl’s mother, ‘The children are young. They 
have to be looked after’ were not taken as ‘recorded evidence’ and was never evoked during 
the arguments or in the final order. The record of the interactions taking place during the trial 
indeed ‘selects among [the voice of litigants] silencing some and transforming other to 
conform to legal categories and conventions’ (Conley & O'Barr 1990: 168). Consequently, 
what witnesses say before the judge is as important as what they say outside the court (Ibid.: 
35), where what is presented through the grill of a penal section, discussed according to a 
procedural protocol and judged on the basis of evidence or of a precedent, takes the form of a 
life story that participants in the trial reformulate and redefine according to their own role in 
the trial and their respective point of view.  
The case also shows how Indian court proceedings maintain the important common law 
principle according to which the initial recorded statement ‘is not part of the evidence before 
the court’. By contrast, we have seen that at the time of the trial the interactions are carefully 
recorded, although adapted to a specific language and judiciary codification. If this recording 
of the oral statements guarantees the witnesses the power to confirm or deny what they are 
supposed to have said at the moment of the investigation, it certainly does not guarantee the 
prosecutor success in proving his case. In fact, similar to what Mckillop notes in general for 
adversarial systems, the Indian trial is ‘something of a lottery [whose] outcomes are 
dependent upon many variables’, (Mckillop 1997: 565) which lends the criminal justice 
system a high degree of unpredictability. The case presented here shows how one of the most 
important variables determining the outcome of the trial is that of ‘hostile witnesses’. A case, 
which at the beginning relied on eleven ‘prosecution witnesses’, with no defense witnesses at 
all, ended up being impossible for the prosecutor to prove.  
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